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IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR 
I N  THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: 
THE PRINCIPLES OF ADAM SMITH 
AS AN ETHICAL BASIS FOR REGULATION 
OF CORPORATE SPEECH 
~ 
By Robert L. Kerr 
The corporate voice is arguably the loudest in mass communication 
today and has been the subject of a series of landmark Supreme Court 
decisions since 1978. This integrative essay offers an ethical basis for 
justihing regulation of corporate speech, based on the neglected moral 
and political theories ofAdam Smith. His essential tenets on free markets 
areapplied to the First Amendment marketplaceof ideas concept that has 
been prominent in developing corporate free-speech rights. This essay 
argues that regulation of covporate speech on this basis can actually 
enable more ideas to flourish in the political marketplace+dvancing 
utilitarian ideals of the common good. 
During the past century and a half, the business corporation has 
evolved into such a dominant force that it has been described as ”the 
most central institution in modern society.”’ By the late nineteenth 
century, many Americans already had begun to feel that they were 
”governed more by corporations than by the state.”2 With such lucrative, 
state-endowed advantages as limited liability and perpetual life, the 
organizational structure known in law as the corporate form has proven 
since then to be an unprecedented generator of wealth and influence, 
characterized as “mankind’s sole remaining endea~or .”~  As a manifes- 
tation of that virtually unmatched power, the corporate voice is arguably 
the loudest in mass communication today! 
In a capitalist, democratic republic, can that voice be moderated by 
other interests in society? Can competing values be institutionalized in 
order to further such interests? And if so, is there an ethical basis for 
justifying such measures? Commentators have disagreed sharply on 
those essential questions, particularly during the past quarter-century as 
the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a series of landmark decisions on 
corporate ~peech .~  In 1978‘s First National Bank of Boston v.  Bellotti, the 
Court established First Amendment protection for corporate speech- 
media messages by corporations that are designed to affect social climate 
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or political outcomes.6 Since Bellotti, federal and state governments have 
sought to regulate corporate speech without infringing the free-speech 
protection constitutionalized in that decision, in order to address the 
potentially damaging effects of corporate speech on democratic pro- 
cesses. However, the debate over whether justification exists for such 
regulation has continued. 
That debate centers on the question of whether regulation of 
corporate speech advances or diminishes free speech in a democratic 
society. The purpose of this integrative essay is to offer an ethical basis for 
justifying regulation of corporate speech, a basis derived from the 
theories of Adam Smith. Though he is more widely known for his 
economic principles, Smith was ”a moral philosopher by profession, and 
his writings deal with ethics as much as  economic^."^ Popular modern 
images of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher as simply a con- 
servative economist and free-trade theorist neglect the larger thrust of his 
thinking. 
Criticism of corporate-speech regulation contends that such regu- 
lation is not justified and is not in the best interests of society. However, 
this study draws on Smith’s concepts to argue the opposite. Essentially, 
Smith called for limiting government in order to allow the motivation of 
self-interest to flourish and generate material benefits for society- 
because that advanced the utilitarian value of the common good, Smiths 
ultimate concern. However, he also emphasized that a system of justice 
was essential to protect all members of society as well as possible- 
including protecting free markets from domination by the most power- 
ful business interests. 
The approach used in this study conceptualizes ethics as a rational 
process, which is based upon underlying principles, for addressing 
values in conflict. Smiths principles are argued here as an ethical basis 
for considering the conflicting values reflected in the debate over regu- 
lation of corporate speech. This approach draws upon utilitarianism, a 
school of thought from the teleological branch of ethics, which begins 
with the premise that consequences are important in deciding whether 
an act or a rule is ethical. Originally articulated by Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, utilitarianism proposes that 
justice can be determined through a process of ethical reasoning that 
considers the degree to which an action contributes to the greater societal 
good. ”Act utilitarianism” is concerned with the ethics of specific deci- 
sions, while “rule utilitarianism” deals more broadly with the ethical 
justification for societal practices or institutions. The latter concept is 
employed in this study? 
While ethics and law are separate concerns in one sense-law 
being concerned more with what is, and ethics more with what ought to 
be-they are hardly unrelated. Ethical considerations must underlie the 
development and interpretation of law in order for justice to be served, 
particularly when competing values are at stake in such ways that the 
letter of the law does not offer clear resolution. This study’s application 
of ethical principles as justification for legal doctrine broadly reflects the 
Ethics and 
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Smithianconcept of such a relationship betweenethics and law. Behrman, 
for example, analyzes Smiths work in terms of key institutions based 
upon societal values and expressed ethics-r values in action-de- 
signed to balance and maximize individual freedom and social good? 
Niebuhr characterized law as “a compromise between moral ideas and 
practical possibilities.”10 
Broad philosophical concepts underlie or support many funda- 
mentals of the law. American constitutional law, for example, begins 
with a priority on promoting the common welfare. First Amendment law 
reflects a philosophical interest in advancing such values as democratic 
governance, the search for truth, and individual fulfillment through 
freedom of expression.” First Amendment issues frequently involve 
complicated questions of competing values, and this is very much the 
case in the debate over regulation of corporate speech. Therefore, this 
study seeks to advance the debate through an analysis of Smithian 
theory. That analysis supports a rule-utilitarianism argument that regu- 
lation of corporate speech is ethically sound in terms of the degree to 
which it contributes to the greater societal good. 
In particular, this discussion will argue that Smith’s essential tenets 
on free markets can be applied to the First Amendment marketplace-of- 
ideas concept** that has been prominent in shaping free speech rights 
for corporations. That is, Smith’s concept of individuals competing 
equally in a free market toward the greatest good for society can be 
applied to the concept of ideas competing in a free market. His principles 
consistently provide support for this study’s assertion that regulation 
efforts related to corporate speech do not reduce ideas in the political 
marketplace but enable more ideas to flourish-advancing utilitarian 
ideals of the common good. 
Adam Smith As a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, Adam Smith lectured in theology, 
ethics, and jurisprudence. He became part of a circle of scholars at the 
Scottish universities at Glasgow and Edinburgh whose work is often 
referred to today as “the Scottish Historical School” or “the Scottish 
School.”13 Broadly, their work analyzed historical changes in concepts of 
property and the effects of such changes on society. Smith became 
famous with the 1759 publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in 
which he focused on ethical theory. In An Inquiry Into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, Smith advanced his 
economic theories. After his death in 1790, students’ notes from his 
lectures at Glasgow were published as Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
which focused on his theories of justice. Smith‘s main interest was in 
investigating ”whether the effects of market commercial society were 
good or bad for individuals and government,” and his ”ultimate norma- 
tive goal [was] the improvement of men and g~vernment.’’~~Thus, “[tlhe 
political significance of Smiths writings derives from his concern not 
only for the economic wealth of the nation, but also for the well-being of 
society as a whole and for the freedom of the individual within that 
so~iety.‘”~ 
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Yet the popular image of Smith remains that of an economist who 
advocated the pursuit of profits governed by nothing but the ”invisible 
hand.”16 Although Smith actually based his economic theories upon his 
theories of jurisprudence, and those in turn were based upon his moral 
theories, “Smith’s modern followers tend to be economists without a 
strong sense of civic life, and so that is how his admirers and detractors 
see Smith himself.”17 As a result, ”[elven in its traditional, run-of-the- 
classroom versions, the prevailing view of Adam Smith’s philosophy 
renders him far more like Boesky and Gekko than even the most rabid 
reading allows.”1s 
After Smith‘s death, the interpretation of his ideas was taken up by 
many who were interested only in his work on political economy.19 
Wealth of Nations was published the same year that American revolution- 
aries declared independence, and the book was influential in the new 
nation. However, too many Americans learned economics from texts 
that tended to ”distort both Smith‘s moral theory and his economics. 
These texts emphasized laissez-faire, a word Smith did not use, and 
competitive individualism, at the cost of the benevolence and justice 
which Smith emphasized.”20 Because of these factors, “[tlhe main impact 
of Wealth of Nations was to establish a powerful economic justification for 
the untrammeled pursuit of individual self-interest.”21 
This essay argues that Smith‘s work in fact justifies the regulation 
of self-interest-but only to the extent that such pursuit endangers the 
common good. The next section briefly summarizes the corporate- 
speech case law as established by Bellotti and related decisions. That is 
followed by a discussion of issues under debate concerning regulation of 
corporate speech. Then Smith’s work is analyzed in terms of the ethical 
arguments it supports concerning regulation of corporate speech. 
One of the major arguments asserted by the government in Bellotti 
as justification for regulation of corporate speech in referenda campaigns 
in Massachusetts was an interest in sustaining the active role of indi- 
vidual citizens in the electoral process and maintaining citizens’ confi- 
dence in government. The government contended that the wealth and 
power of corporations could drown out other points of view and under- 
mine democratic processes. The majority and minority on the Court split 
sharply over that issue in the 5-4 decision, with the majority emphasizing 
the listener’s First Amendment right to receive information on the theory 
that it contributes to democratic decision making. Thus, the Court 
restricted government from limiting the marketplace’s range of informa- 
tion and ideas-including corporate speech-to which the public is 
exposed.22 
The Court has maintained this restriction on government in most 
areas of corporate speech. In Central Hudson Gas G. Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Cornrn i s s i~n~~  in 1980, the question involved the right of govern- 
ment to regulate corporate speech relating to the 1970s energy 
Although the case is more often discussed today in terms of the balancing 
test it established for the protection of commercial Justice John 
Paul Stevens argued in his concurring opinion that the regulation in 
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question suppressed corporate political speech beyond commercial speech 
because the banned speech could address questions under debate by 
political leadersz6 The Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the regulation was 
not justified-even though it advanced the government's substantial 
interest in conserving energy-because it was more extensive than 
necessary to further that intere~t.2~ Another New York utility corpora- 
tion successfully asserted First Amendment interests in Consolidated 
Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission of New York ?8 The 
Court based its decision in part on the Bellotti holding that "the inherent 
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does 
not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, associa- 
tion, union, or ind i~ idua l . "~~ 
A corporate newsletter published by Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company was the focal point of the controversy that produced Pacific Gas 
b Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission.30 When a consumer group 
complained to the Public Utilities Commission of California that the 
newsletter sometimes included items that could be considered political 
comment, the commission ruled that such groups could have access to 
"extra space" in the billing envelope.3l PG&E contended the order 
violated its First Amendment rights, and the Supreme Court agreed, 
unanimously finding in 1986 that the regulation impermissibly bur- 
dened the utility's free-speech rights by requiring it to associate with 
speech with which it might not agree?2 
However, the Supreme Court has allowed government regulation 
that targets corporate speech in order to address corruption or the 
appearance of corruption. In Federal Election Commission v. National Right 
to Work Committee, decided in 1982,33 a challenge was brought against a 
federal campaign regulation that was designed to ensure that money 
used by corporations in political activity represented the speech interests 
of those whose money was involved.34 The Supreme Court upheld the 
regulation, unanimously ruling that the interests the government sought 
to protect were compelling enough to outweigh corporate First Amend- 
ment rights of association asserted by NRWC. The decision described the 
regulation as the culmination of a "careful legislative adjustment of the 
federal electoral laws. . . to prevent both actual and apparent corruption 
. . . [reflecting] a legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the 
corporate structure require particularly careful reg~lat ion."~~ In Federal 
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life"6 in 1986, the Court 
upheld the principle underlying the same regulation at issue in NRWC- 
that corporations amassing great wealth in the economic marketplace 
should not gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace. (However, 
the Court ruled that the regulation did not apply to Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, a nonprofit corporation devoted to ending abortion, 
because it was formed to disseminate political ideas rather than to amass 
capital.)37 
In 1990's Austin v .  Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the most 
recent corporate-speech case, the Court upheld a Michigan regulation 
addressing, in the words of the Court, "the corrosive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
398 {OURNAUSM 6 MASS COMMllNIuUrON QUARTERLY 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jmq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas. . . . It ensures that 
expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas es- 
poused by corporations.“ Reasoning that “corporate wealth can unfairly 
influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent 
expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political 
contributions,” the Court held that state governments may regulate 
independent expenditures by  corporation^.^^ 
In summary, the constitutional right for corporate speech estab- 
lished in Bellotti was reinforced in Central Hudson, Consolidated Edison, 
and Pacific Gas & Electric. It was tightened or focused in NRWC, MCFL, 
and Austin, clarifying the degree to which corporate First Amendment 
rights are less than those of individuals. The case law emphasizes that 
regulation of corporate speech should target prevention of corruption or 
the appearance of corruption, and that political speech by corporations 
should reflect public support, not just the economic power of the corpo- 
ration. However, the Court has maintained a strong aversion to any 
content regulation of corporate speech. The government is required to 
establish compelling justification that a regulation of corporate speech 
addresses some form of real or apparent corruption in order to establish 
constitutionality. Parallels between Smithian theory and the Court’s 
holdings and language in corporate-speech decisions will be detailed 
below, after discussions of the scholarly debate over corporate speech 
and of Smithian ethics in more depth. 
Critical themes that run through the literature on corporate speech 
highlight the debate over whether such speech undermines or advances 
democratic processes. The broad issues under contention have been 
characterized as an attempt to resolve a core philosophical conflict 
between liberal democratic ideology and organizational val~es,3~ or 
between individual freedom of expression and social utility.40 Rome and 
Roberts characterized the conflict as one between (1) the belief that 
corporate expression differs from individual expression to such an 
extent that it should receive lesser or no First Amendment protection, 
and (2) the belief that “protection of every species of expression . . . not 
only is protection of the right of the speaker but. . . is at least in part, for 
the benefit of listeners or  recipient^."^^ 
Both camps are well represented in the literature. Greenwood 
dismissed corporate speech as antithetical to the basic principles of 
democracy and deserving of no constitutional pro tec t i~n .~~ Deetz as- 
serted that in Bellotti, ”the corporation is given rights like those of an 
individual, [but] the individual is not given the expression power of the 
corporation,” and argued corporate influence is maintained through ”a 
colonization of public decision making.”43 Kuhn and Berg argued that 
”complex, little understood social system[s] . . . [corporations] alter the 
structure of society . . . [through] the governmental role they have 
assumed.’’44 Weissman asserted recently that it is now the norm for 
corporations to engage in massive campaign spending on all 
initiatives and referenda that may affect corporate intere~ts.4~ Research 
has shown correlations suggesting that corporate spending influences 
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the outcomes of elections, although the outcomes may be affected by 
other 
Many scholars writing in response to the Bellotti decision predicted 
correctly that it would greatly restrict state regulation of corporate 
spending to influence referenda voting. “It will be difficult to draft a state 
statute whose burden would be held a reasonable one,“ Fox f0recast.4~ 
Hart and Shore foresaw corporations of all sorts becoming “even more 
involved in electoral po l i t i~s . ”~~  Baker predicted that Bellotti would 
seriously undermine citizens’ influence on democracy because corporate 
speech is dictated by profit-maximizing mandates of the market, not the 
human values of indi~iduals.4~ Prentice anticipated, accurately, it has 
turned out, that Bellot ti would allow government regulation of corporate 
electoral activity “when that activity is based upon solid evidence that 
the target activity would lead to corruption or the appearance of it.”50 
Friedman and May strongly advocated such regulatory efforts: ”If 
it weren’t for our ultimate political sovereignty [as individuals], then our 
political speech would not have the constitutional importance which it 
now has.. . . Corporations are not, as such, sovereign members of our civil 
society. They exist at the sufferance of law and judicial ruling.”51 Gowri 
also argued against unregulated corporate speech, proposing a system 
whereby corporations would disclose all political spending and offer 
rebates to shareholders who did not approve of the causes supported ”If 
corporate speech could be brought into closer alignment with share- 
holder views, then the voice speaking to hearers in the marketplace 
would be closer to a human voice; and the loud competing views 
confronting other speakers would be closer to human views.”52 
On the other side of the debate, proponents have maintained it is 
healthier to free the corporate voice than to stifle it. Foreshadowing 
Bellotti a decade before the Supreme Court decision, Epstein wrote that 
”the expanding importance of governmental involvement in the opera- 
tions of the economy . . . has resulted in the necessity of increased 
corporate political involvement.” He argued that corporations ”should 
be placed on a legal parity with other social interests” because the 
corporation ”contributes to the maintenance of pluralistic democracy in 
America rather than endangers it.”53 Barry contended that corporations 
serve a vital political function in a democratic society, that of upholding 
the property and contractual rights of their stockholders through lawful 
expansion of profits.54 Redish and Wasserman asserted that constitu- 
tional protection for corporate political speech fulfills First Amendment 
values because ”the corporate form performs an important democratic 
function in facilitating the personal self-realization of the individuals 
who have made the voluntary choice to make use of it,“ and because 
“corporate speech may serve a vital role in checking potential govern- 
ment excesses.”55 
Some scholars have asserted that other forces are more effective 
than government at promoting responsible corporate speech. There is ”a 
large social interest in hearing what corporations have to say about 
public issues,” Sunstein argued, emphasizing that “no one is forced to 
believe what the corporations claim.”56 To that end, individuals will be 
made aware by alternate sources if a corporation‘s actions are incongru- 
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ent with its messages, Sethi c0ntended.5~ Butler and Ribstein made the 
case that ”Corporate power may, in fact, better represent voter support 
than the groups that would gain from a reallocation of power,” because 
”corporate speech must conform at least generally with the views of a 
cross-section of the community” or risk alienating shareholders, con- 
sumers, employees, and other publics critical to the success of the 
organization.58 
Ramler condemned the Austin decision, reasoning that restricting 
corporate freedom of speech would decrease “the amount of information 
upon which voters may rely to make intelligent decisions about the 
officials who will represent them in g~vernment .”~~ Schofield predicted 
that Austin would make the First Amendment protection granted to 
corporate political speech by Bellotti “very easy to circumvent for a state 
that wishes to regulate ’free’ political speech,” contending that Austin 
”may have weakened other fundamental rights that are currently pro- 
tected by the ’compelling state interest’ requirement.”60 Geary criticized 
Austin’s definition of corruption as too broad.61 
In summary, the ideological debate regarding First Amendment 
protection for corporate speech is highlighted by sharp disagreement as 
to whether regulation of such speech enhances or diminishes the greater 
interests of a democratic society. This study advances the discussion by 
asserting justification for regulation of corporate speech based on ethical 
principles. Adam Smith’s principles provide ethical direction by em- 
ploying free-market theory to promote utilitarian ideals of the greater 
common good. In the next section, Smith’s essential tenets on free 
markets are applied to the concept of the First Amendment marketplace 
of ideas. The argument is made that regulation efforts related to corpo- 
rate speech canwork to expand the marketplace of ideas and enable more 
ideas to flourish, thus enhancing democratic processes and the common 
good. 
Given that Smith developed his ideas in a pre-capitalist, pre- 
democratic world, his comprehensive eighteenth-century prescriptives 
cannot simply be transposed whole upon twenty-first-century corporate 
behavior. However, Smiths enduring principles remain useful in con- 
sidering ethical issues today, particularly the corporate-speech issues 
addressed in this study. 
In fact, the frequent distortion of Smith’s ideas reflects a failure to 
place them in their proper historical context and thus a crucial lack of 
awareness of the dominant economic realities under which he wrote. 
Smith’s economic theories emphasized market forces and consumer 
autonomy as an alternative to the political economy of mercantilism. His 
system, which later would be referred to as capitalism, was “as revolu- 
tionary a concept with respect to the dominant mercantilism of its day as 
Marx’s communism was to the capitalism of the mid-nineteenth cen- 
tury.”62 The greatest priority of the economic system of mercantilism 
was enriching the nation-state, basically by maximizing exports and 
minimizing imports. Thus, ”[m]ercantilism benefited producers and 
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middle classes, who were forced to pay inflated prices for domestically 
produced goods which were shielded from foreign competition by 
various protectionist  mechanism^."^^ As Smith wrote: “It cannot be very 
difficult to determinewho havebeen the contrivers of this whole mercan- 
tile system; not the customers, we may believe, whose interest has been 
entirely neglected; but the producers whose interest has been so carefully 
attended to.”64 
So Smith was reacting against mercantilism, not defending the 
modern-day, private-enterprise system.65 The driving force behind 
Smith’s vigorous critique of the status quo was his desire to improve the 
harsh living conditions he saw in Scotland and England.”66 Rather than 
blaming the poor for their misfortunes, as mercantilist theory did, Smith 
blamed the economic system. To that end he called for abandoning 
mercantilist policies of sanctioning monopolies, putting quotas on im- 
ports, regulating tradesmen, and restricting other aspects of economic 
behavior. Smith opposed that sort of government regulation because it 
privileged the few at the expense of the many and prevented most from 
competing fairly in a free market. Thus we find ”the thread that runs 
through all his works” is “how the market can be structured to make the 
pursuit of self-interest benefit 
When we consider the marketplace of ideas in terms of Smith’s free 
market, it is clear that openness for all competitors and consumers is the 
priority. However, the interests of the most powerful competitors may 
work against openness. As Smith observed, “The interest of the dealers 
. . . in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in some 
respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the publick. To 
widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest 
of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough 
to the interest of the publick; but to narrow the competition must always 
be against it.”68 
Smith‘s use of the term ”invisible h a n d  in Wealth of Nations does 
not represent a blanket defense of untrammeled self-interest, as it is often 
characterized in arguments against the regulation of business. Smiths 
”invisible h a n d  represents instead a metaphor for the socially positive 
but unintended consequences that, as he theorized it, paradoxically can 
result from the pursuit of self-interest in market activity. Bishop ex- 
plained that Smith found it desirable to allow individuals to base their 
economic choices on self-interest because the “constant drive of most 
people to improve their economic and social condition provided the 
incentive for individuals to direct their economic activities towards 
wealth production, and this ultimately would increase the overall wealth 
of society.”69 
Thus Smith was a champion of individualism, but not to the extent 
that its excesses destroyed community. He did not, after all, title his most 
famous work The Wealth oflndividuals. Smith’s concept of limited govern- 
ment encouraging individual self-interest to flourish was based on what 
he saw as the relentless passion of humans for “bettering our condition, 
a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us 
from the womb, and never leaves us till we go in the grave. . . . In the 
whole interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce 
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perhaps a single instant in which any man is so perfectly and completely 
satisfied with his situation, as to be without any wish of alteration or 
improvement of any kind.”70 Thomas Jefferson regarded The Wealth of 
Nations as the best book available on political and he and 
others envisioned Smith’s concept of self-interest being developed in 
terms of both economic and political involvement for all: 
Self-interest could only be accounted socially benign if it 
could be demonstrated that all this incessant striving after 
private ends did not lead to chaos. . . . [Smith theorized that] 
the urge to improve oneself through profitable exchanges 
prompted each to commit her and his resources most advan- 
tageously, and when disciplined by competition, led inexo- 
rably to the greatest good for society.. . .Where [Jeffersonian] 
Republicans differed from Federalists was in the moral char- 
acter they gave to economic development. . . . [Tlhe more 
equal [than in England] social conditions that prevailed in 
America made it possible to think of the economists’ descrip- 
tion of the market as a template for . . . a society of economi- 
cally progressive, socially equal, and politically competent 
citizens.” 
Smith’s emphasis on equality of economic and political opportu- 
nity does not ”imply that Smith favored equality of outcomes. Clearly he 
did not, nor did he think that such equality would be a result of a free- 
market economy. But the market is most efficient and most fair when 
there is competition among similarly matched parties.”73 In that vein, 
this study asserts that the marketplace of ideas will operate more 
efficiently and fairly when competing parties have similar opportunities 
to communicate ideas, and that a free marketplace of ideas contributes to 
utilitarian ideals of the greater common good. 
This essay does not suggest that any Supreme Court holdings in 
corporate-speech cases have been based expressly upon Smithian prin- 
ciples. In his dissenting opinion in the Central Hudson case, Justice 
William Rehnquist did make a brief reference to the concept of the 
marketplace of ideas being analogous to Smith’s concept of a free 
economic market.74 However, none of the other justices has cited Smith 
or specifically articulated any of Smith’s concepts in a corporate-speech 
decision. That said, this study maintains that when we apply Smithian 
principles to corporate speech in the manner articulated in this essay, we 
find that such application is consistent with the holdings and language 
of the Supreme Court’s corporate-speech decisions. 
When characterized in terms of Smith’s concepts, Supreme Court 
decisions on corporate speech represent an ongoing process aimed at 
preventing stronger competitors from diminishing freedom within the 
marketplace of ideas. In Bellotti and related decisions, the Court has 
maintained a difficult Smithian ethical balance regarding regulation of 
the corporate voice. The Court’s corporate-speech decisions have em- 
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phasized preventing corruption and ensuring that corporate political 
speech represents public support. At the same time, those decisions 
stress a limiting of government, which promotes opportunity for the 
expression of the self-interest reflected in corporate speech. Such a 
balance advances ethical concerns, in Smithian theory, because it works 
in the long-term interests of society at large by resisting the narrowing of 
the marketplace. 
Prominent throughout Smith‘s work is the community-oriented 
concept of the “impartial spectator,” articulated at length in his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments: “It is [the impartial spectator] who, whenever we are 
about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice 
capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we 
are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it. 
. . . It is he who shews us the propriety of generosity and the deformity 
of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own for 
the yet greater interests of others.”75 This concept is crucial to Smiths 
concept of justice advancing the common good, which is equally central 
to both Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations.76 
In the former, Smith wrote that a competitor “may run as hard as 
he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all 
his competitors. But if he should jostle, or throw down any of them, the 
indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair 
play, which they cannot admit of.”= And in Wealth of Nations, he wrote 
that government is responsible for ”protecting, as far as possible, every 
member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other 
member of it.”78 Smith asserted the essential duties of government as 
external defense, justice, and public works.79 
In this element of Smithian theory, “Laws of justice act as an 
impartial spectator. . . [safeguarding] both fair play in market exchanges 
and the public welfare. . . . [The invisible hand] is efficient only to the 
extent that it exists within the context of perfect liberty, coordination or 
economic harmony, equally advantageous competition, and fair play. 
. . . The invisible hand, then, is a dependent, not an independent 
variable.”80 Thus it distorts Smith’s work to focus only on the self-interest 
concepts while ignoring the emphasis he placed on their context within 
a system of social justice. A system of justice, serving the function of the 
impartial spectator, must maintain a free market that protects ”as far as 
possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of 
every other member of it,”81 emphasizing liberty, competition, fair play, 
and limited government. 
The Supreme Court’s corporate-speech decisions as a whole have 
served an ”impartial spectator” function, seeking to ensure that some 
competitors in the marketplace of ideas do not “jostle, or throw down” 
any of the other competitors - as well as to prevent government from 
stifling expression of the self-interest reflected in corporate speech. Thus 
we see that Smith’s theory of free markets and its application here to the 
marketplace of ideas are ethically consistent with justice related to 
corporate speech. 
The language of the Court in its corporate-speech decisions offers 
parallels between Smiths concept of individuals competing equally in a 
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free market toward the greatest good for society and the concept of ideas 
competing in a free market. In the Bellot ti decision, the Court made it clear 
that any regulation of corporate speech could not be based solely on the 
corporate identity of the speaker, finding "no support in the First or 
Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the propo- 
sition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the 
First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a 
corporation."82 The Court's decision struck down a Massachusetts 
statute prohibiting corporations from campaigning to influence the 
outcome of referenda that did not materially affect their business inter- 
ests. The majority held that speech concerning the issues in a referendum 
on a state constitutional amendment is the type of speech indispensable 
to decision making in a democracy, and that corporate speech does not 
represent potential for corruption in referendum campaigns that focus 
on issues rather than individuals, because the former cannot be cor- 
rupted by political debt as the latter may.83 Thus, in Smithian terms, the 
Court began in Bellotti to define when the corporate speaker is only 
running as hard as he can within the bounds of fair play in the market- 
place of ideas-and thus is not subject to government interference. 
Similarly, the Court held in the Central Hudson case that the New 
York Public Service Commission could not ban promotional advertising 
by electric-utility corporations in an effort to reduce energy consump- 
tion, because the government failed to show that a more limited regula- 
tion would not protect its interest in conservation.a In the Consolidated 
Edison case, the Court ruled that the state's Public Service Commission 
could not prohibit public utility corporations from discussing controver- 
sial issues of public policy in monthly utility-bill inserts. Allowing the 
government to determine what material was useful to consumers and 
what was not clearly represented content regulation of political speech, 
the Court said, a practice unconstitutional even when the source of such 
speech is a c0rporation.8~ In the Pacific Gas & Electric decision, the Court 
held that a corporation could not be forced to associate with speech with 
which it might not agree by subjecting it to a regulation requiring the 
corporation to include competing political messages in mailings of a 
corporate newsletter, "speech that the First Amendment is designed to 
protect."*'j 
In all those cases, the Court deemed the expressions of corporate 
speech involved to be-as Smithian theory would characterize it-fair 
play in the marketplace of ideas. In particular, the cases firmly estab- 
lished First Amendment protection for corporate speech from content 
regulation by government. As Justice Powell wrote in Central Hudson: "If 
the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, governments must 
not be allowed to choose 'which issues are worth discussing or 
debating."'87 
However, consistent with Smithian theory that the indulgence of 
the spectators may end if a violation of fair play should occur, the Court 
has delineated ways in which corporate speech may corrupt the market- 
place of ideas. In Bellotti, the Court said: "According to [the government], 
corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out 
other points of view. If [these] arguments were supported by record or 
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legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to 
undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serv- 
ing First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our consid- 
eration." In that decision, the Court held there was no showing of 
democratic processes being undermined.m However, in later corporate- 
speech cases, the Court did in fact deem that undermining of democratic 
processes was addressed by the regulations at issue. 
In the NRWC decision, for example, the Court noted: "The govern- 
mental interest in preventing both actual corruption and the appearance 
of corruption of elected representatives has long been recognized, and 
there is no reason why it may not in this case be accomplished by treating 
unions, corporations and similar organizations differently from indi- 
vidual~,"*~ In Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, the Court had defined corruption 
as "a subversion of the political process" in which "[ellected officials are 
influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office."90 In NKWC, the 
Court accepted the government's assertion that the regulation of corpo- 
rate speech under question in the case ensured "that substantial aggre- 
gations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the 
corporate form of organization should not be converted into political 
'war chests' which could be used to incur political debts from legisla- 
t o r ~ . ' ' ~ ~  In Smithian theory, such corruption would work to narrow the 
political marketplace of ideas because democratic processes would then 
be influenced more by unfair corporate influence on elected officials than 
by ideas competing freely. 
In language strikingly resonant of the Smithian emphasis on 
government maintaining fairness in the marketplace of ideas, the Court 
in the MCFL decision declared: 
Resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be 
used to provide an unfair advantage in the political market- 
place. Political "free trade" does not necessarily require that 
all who participate in the political marketplace do so with 
exactly equal resources. . . . Relative availability of funds is 
after all a rough barometer of public support. The resources 
in the treasury of a business corporation, however, are not an 
indication of popular support for the corporation's political 
ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated deci- 
sions of investors and customers. . . . [Tlhese resources may 
make a corporation a formidable political presence, even 
though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of 
the power of its ideas.92 
In this assertion, the Court sought to prevent competitors with 
advantages in the economic marketplace (such as the corporation's 
limited liability and perpetual life) from utilizing those advantages to 
unfairly diminish the freedom of the marketplace of ideas. "This concern 
over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the 
conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace 
of political ideas. . . . By requiring that corporate independent expendi- 
tures be financed through a political committee expressly established to 
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engage in campaign spending,. . . [the regulation in question] seeks to 
prevent this threat to the political marketplace,” wrote Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr.93 
In the Austin decision, the Court concluded, “Michigan identified 
as a serious danger the significant possibility that corporate political 
expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political process, and it 
has implemented a narrowly tailored solution to that problem.” The 
Court held that the regulation requiring corporations to make campaign 
expenditures through separate funds that were solicited expressly for 
political purposes reduced the threat that ”huge corporate treasuries 
amassed with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influence 
unfairly the outcome of  election^."^^ These assertions are clearly consis- 
tent with Smithian theory. Allowing corporate power to undermine the 
integrity of democratic processes would unfairly distort the political 
marketplace of ideas and work against utilitarian ideals of the common 
good that are represented in maintaining the freedom of that market- 
place. 
That the Supreme Court has found potential in corporate speech 
for corruption of democratic processes would not surprise Smith. He 
”expected that concentrated economic resources could be readily trans- 
lated into political influence, which he considered similar to other 
commodities for which there was a supply and demand.”95 He believed 
that keeping markets free actually involved making sure powerful 
business interests did not use their influence to overwhelm the freedom 
of the market. ”Smith thought . . . in particular, if business people 
pursued their self-interest in the political arena, they would only seek the 
overthrow of the free market system for their own benefit and everyone 
else’s Smith found merchants and manufacturers ”an order of 
men whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public.”97 
The arguments and evidence outlined above establish the useful- 
ness of Smith‘s theories in providing an ethical basis justifying regulation 
of corporate speech-a basis that is consistent with the reasoning in 
Supreme Court cases upholding such regulation. Smith championed the 
concept of individuals competing with equal opportunities in a free 
market as a process that advanced utilitarian ideals of the greater good 
for society. The principles underlying that concept can be applied to the 
First Amendment concept of ideas competing in a free market, and doing 
so provides ethical justification for regulating corporate speech in an 
effort to protect democratic processes. 
In such an application, the justice system is crucial in acting as an 
”impartial spectator” to ensure that some competitors in the marketplace 
of ideas do not dominate it and disadvantage other competitors -but 
also to prevent government from stifling expression of the self-interest 
reflected in corporate speech. In its corporate-speech decisions, the 
Supreme Court has particularly emphasized preventing corruption and 
ensuring that corporate speech represents public support. The holdings 
and language of the Court in its corporate-speech decisions reflect 
Smith’s “impartial spectator” function at work in the marketplace of 
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ideas, seeking to protect ”as far as possible, every member of the society 
from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it,”98 and 
stressing fair play by competitors in that marketplace. 
Assessing regulation of corporate speech within these parameters 
provides ethical direction on Smith’s terms, employing free-market 
theory in the manner he actually intended-as a means for advancing 
utilitarian ideals of the greater common good. 
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